Pro-Attitude Theology Redux
In my last post I introduced pro-attitude theology as an alternative to perfect being theology. As developed there, pro-attitude theology rests on the following claims:
(A) For every pro-attitude A, there is at least one property P such that something that has P deserves having someone bear A towards it.
(B) Every pro-attitude comes in degrees.
(C) For every pro-attitude A, there is a highest degree of A.
(D) For every pro-attitude A and every property P, if something that has P deserves having someone bear A towards it, then there is some degree of P such that something that has P to at that degree deserves having someone bear A towards it to the highest degree.
(A) and (B) are, I think, relatively uncontroversial. At the very least, they seem plausible. On the other hand, (C) and (D) seem less plausible. Perhaps some pro-attitudes are such that there is no highest degree of them. And perhaps there are properties such that something that has them deserves having someone bear some pro-attitude towards it but are also such that there is no degree of those properties such that something that has one of those properties to that degree deserves having someone bear the corresponding pro-attitude towards it to the highest degree.
Here I would like to suggest a way of modifying pro-attitude theology that holds onto (A)-(C) but does not suppose (D). According to this modification of pro-attitude theology, something is divine just in case for every pro-attitude A, that thing has some property P to some degree D such that something that has P to degree D deserves having someone bear A towards it to the highest degree. According to this modification of pro-attitude theology, then, a divine being is simply something that deserves having every pro-attitude borne to it to the highest degree.
The interesting thing about this modified sort of pro-attitude theology is that it allows for different "ways of being divine", as it were. What mean by this is that whereas the form of pro-attitude theology discussed in the previous post required that a divine being have every pro-attitude worthy property and that it have that property to whatever degree is necessary to make it deserve to have someone bear the corresponding pro-attitude towards it to the highest degree, the modified sort of pro-attitude theology I am currently discussing does not require that a divine being have every pro-attitude worthy property. Rather it simply requires that it have some of those properties to such a degree that it deserves having every pro-attitude borne towards it to the highest degree. What this means is that there might be two divine beings that have different pro-attitude worthy properties. All that is required, in the end, is that they deserve to have every pro-attitude borne towards them in the highest degree. And it may be in virtue of having different properties that they deserve this.
(A) For every pro-attitude A, there is at least one property P such that something that has P deserves having someone bear A towards it.
(B) Every pro-attitude comes in degrees.
(C) For every pro-attitude A, there is a highest degree of A.
(D) For every pro-attitude A and every property P, if something that has P deserves having someone bear A towards it, then there is some degree of P such that something that has P to at that degree deserves having someone bear A towards it to the highest degree.
(A) and (B) are, I think, relatively uncontroversial. At the very least, they seem plausible. On the other hand, (C) and (D) seem less plausible. Perhaps some pro-attitudes are such that there is no highest degree of them. And perhaps there are properties such that something that has them deserves having someone bear some pro-attitude towards it but are also such that there is no degree of those properties such that something that has one of those properties to that degree deserves having someone bear the corresponding pro-attitude towards it to the highest degree.
Here I would like to suggest a way of modifying pro-attitude theology that holds onto (A)-(C) but does not suppose (D). According to this modification of pro-attitude theology, something is divine just in case for every pro-attitude A, that thing has some property P to some degree D such that something that has P to degree D deserves having someone bear A towards it to the highest degree. According to this modification of pro-attitude theology, then, a divine being is simply something that deserves having every pro-attitude borne to it to the highest degree.
The interesting thing about this modified sort of pro-attitude theology is that it allows for different "ways of being divine", as it were. What mean by this is that whereas the form of pro-attitude theology discussed in the previous post required that a divine being have every pro-attitude worthy property and that it have that property to whatever degree is necessary to make it deserve to have someone bear the corresponding pro-attitude towards it to the highest degree, the modified sort of pro-attitude theology I am currently discussing does not require that a divine being have every pro-attitude worthy property. Rather it simply requires that it have some of those properties to such a degree that it deserves having every pro-attitude borne towards it to the highest degree. What this means is that there might be two divine beings that have different pro-attitude worthy properties. All that is required, in the end, is that they deserve to have every pro-attitude borne towards them in the highest degree. And it may be in virtue of having different properties that they deserve this.
posted by Greg at 6:20 AM
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