The Philosophy of the Cool: Against the Subjectivist/Relativist Approach
Let's face it: Some things are cool, and others are not. And when I say that, I'm not talking about being cool to the touch. Rather, I'm using the word 'cool' in the way someone might if they said 'That movie was cool' or 'Rock 'n rool is cool'. Here I want to argue against a particular approach to ascriptions of coolness.
Many are likely to say that ascriptions of coolness are, in some sense "subjective" or "relative to taste". They might express their view by saying things like: 'What's cool for some people isn't cool for others' or 'One person might think that something is cool and another person might think that it isn't cool and both of them might be right'.
I think this view is probably false, just as I think that similar views concerning ethics and aesthetics are false. I want to explain why I reject this view by explaining why I reject particular ways of making it more precise. Unfortunately, I can't address every version of the view. But hopefully by addressing a few versions of the view and showing why they should be rejected, I can make it plausible that every version of the view should be rejected.
One version of the subjectivist/relativist view holds that whenever anyone uses the predicate 'is cool' to apply to something, that person is simply expressing some sort of approval of that thing. So, for instance, if I utter the sentence 'That movie is cool', referring to "Shaun of the Dead", it is just as though I had said 'Yay, "Shaun of the Dead"!'.
This version of the subjectivist/relativist view is analogous to expressivist views in ethics, and should be rejected for the same reasons. The main reason that such views should be rejected is that they conflict with obvious claims concerning disagreement. So, for instance, if I say 'That movie is cool' and you say 'That movie isn't cool' and we are both referring to "Shaun of the Dead", then we disagree. However, one cannot disagree with "Yay, "Shaun of the Dead"!", since one who says 'Yay, "Shaun of the Dead"!' is not making a claim and so you one cannot disagree with the claim made. Thus, since the view we are considering is one according to which it is just as though I had said 'Yay, "Shaun of the Dead"!' when I say 'That movie is cool', you do not disagree with me when you say 'That movie isn't cool'. Since you do disagree with me, this version of the subjectivist/relativist view is false.
A different version of the subjectivist/relativist view holds that 'is cool' functions a lot like words like 'I', which are commonly called 'indexicals'. When I say "I am hungry" and you say "I am hungry", what I say may be true while what you say is false (because I might be hungry even though you aren't). Similarly, according to this view, when I say 'That movie is cool' and you say 'That movie was cool' and we are both referring to "Shaun of the Dead", what I say may be true while what you say is false. And just as you would say something true in the example involving 'I' if you said 'I am not hungry', so too you would say something true in the example involving 'is cool' if you said 'That movie isn't cool'.
There are two makor problems with this version of the subjectivist/relativist view. One problem is that, again, it seems to conflict with obvious claims concerning disagreement. Just as you do not disagree with me when I say 'I am hungry' and you say 'I am not hungry', so too on this view when I say 'That movie is cool' and you say 'That movie isn't cool', you do not disagree with me. So, the view in question is false.
Another problem with the view has to do with reporting what others say. For instance, if you say 'I am hungry', I cannot correctly report what you say by saying 'You said that I am hungry' because you didn't say that I am hungry, you said that you are hungry. Instead, I have to say 'You said that you are hungry' to correctly report what you said. So, if 'is cool' functions like 'I', then if you say 'That movie is cool', I cannot correctly report what you said by saying 'You said that that movie is cool'. But I can. So, the second version of the subjectivist/relativist view is false.
Let me sum up what I have done in this post. I have introduced and argued against two versions of the subjectivist/relativist approach to ascriptions of coolness. I conclude that these versions fail. More tentatively, I conclude that no version of the subjectivist/relativist approach is correct. Given that this is so, what approach should we take to ascriptions of coolness? I think that the obvious alternative is an objectivist approach according to which there are objective facts of coolness that are not "subjective" or "relative to taste". On this view, whenever one person describes something using the words 'is cool' and another describes the same thing using the words 'is not cool', one and only one of them is right. The other is simply wrong.
Many are likely to say that ascriptions of coolness are, in some sense "subjective" or "relative to taste". They might express their view by saying things like: 'What's cool for some people isn't cool for others' or 'One person might think that something is cool and another person might think that it isn't cool and both of them might be right'.
I think this view is probably false, just as I think that similar views concerning ethics and aesthetics are false. I want to explain why I reject this view by explaining why I reject particular ways of making it more precise. Unfortunately, I can't address every version of the view. But hopefully by addressing a few versions of the view and showing why they should be rejected, I can make it plausible that every version of the view should be rejected.
One version of the subjectivist/relativist view holds that whenever anyone uses the predicate 'is cool' to apply to something, that person is simply expressing some sort of approval of that thing. So, for instance, if I utter the sentence 'That movie is cool', referring to "Shaun of the Dead", it is just as though I had said 'Yay, "Shaun of the Dead"!'.
This version of the subjectivist/relativist view is analogous to expressivist views in ethics, and should be rejected for the same reasons. The main reason that such views should be rejected is that they conflict with obvious claims concerning disagreement. So, for instance, if I say 'That movie is cool' and you say 'That movie isn't cool' and we are both referring to "Shaun of the Dead", then we disagree. However, one cannot disagree with "Yay, "Shaun of the Dead"!", since one who says 'Yay, "Shaun of the Dead"!' is not making a claim and so you one cannot disagree with the claim made. Thus, since the view we are considering is one according to which it is just as though I had said 'Yay, "Shaun of the Dead"!' when I say 'That movie is cool', you do not disagree with me when you say 'That movie isn't cool'. Since you do disagree with me, this version of the subjectivist/relativist view is false.
A different version of the subjectivist/relativist view holds that 'is cool' functions a lot like words like 'I', which are commonly called 'indexicals'. When I say "I am hungry" and you say "I am hungry", what I say may be true while what you say is false (because I might be hungry even though you aren't). Similarly, according to this view, when I say 'That movie is cool' and you say 'That movie was cool' and we are both referring to "Shaun of the Dead", what I say may be true while what you say is false. And just as you would say something true in the example involving 'I' if you said 'I am not hungry', so too you would say something true in the example involving 'is cool' if you said 'That movie isn't cool'.
There are two makor problems with this version of the subjectivist/relativist view. One problem is that, again, it seems to conflict with obvious claims concerning disagreement. Just as you do not disagree with me when I say 'I am hungry' and you say 'I am not hungry', so too on this view when I say 'That movie is cool' and you say 'That movie isn't cool', you do not disagree with me. So, the view in question is false.
Another problem with the view has to do with reporting what others say. For instance, if you say 'I am hungry', I cannot correctly report what you say by saying 'You said that I am hungry' because you didn't say that I am hungry, you said that you are hungry. Instead, I have to say 'You said that you are hungry' to correctly report what you said. So, if 'is cool' functions like 'I', then if you say 'That movie is cool', I cannot correctly report what you said by saying 'You said that that movie is cool'. But I can. So, the second version of the subjectivist/relativist view is false.
Let me sum up what I have done in this post. I have introduced and argued against two versions of the subjectivist/relativist approach to ascriptions of coolness. I conclude that these versions fail. More tentatively, I conclude that no version of the subjectivist/relativist approach is correct. Given that this is so, what approach should we take to ascriptions of coolness? I think that the obvious alternative is an objectivist approach according to which there are objective facts of coolness that are not "subjective" or "relative to taste". On this view, whenever one person describes something using the words 'is cool' and another describes the same thing using the words 'is not cool', one and only one of them is right. The other is simply wrong.
posted by Greg at 12:14 PM
4 Comments:
Isn't emotivism usually introduced (to replace simple self-reporting or 'indexical' subjectivism) precisely as a way to re-introduce genuine disagreement? Sports fans from opposing teams are expressing genuine disagreements in attitude when one says 'boo' and the other, 'hurrah'.
Dude, no more posts? I know you can talk for 3 days straight and leave me believing I'm competely wrong, without having voiced a sentence!!
Hi Richard,
I'm afraid I can't pronounce on the motives of emotivists, so I can't answer your question directly. However, emotivists do seem to think that they can account for genuine disagreement. (Although I must admit that I'm less than convinced of this.)
I'm not sure what the import of this for my post is, however. In the post, I was trying to show that relativism about coolness-ascriptions is false. But emotivism is not a form of relativism. Emotivism is a form of expressivism, which in turn is a form of non-cognitivism. Relativism, on the other hand, is a form of cognitivism. Relativists believe that coolness-ascriptions express truths and falsehoods, but that two people may utter the same coolness-ascription and one of them say something true while the other says something false.
Whoops! Signed in using the wrong account. Just wanted to let you know that really was me.
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