Fine-Tuning
In my opinion, the strongest argument in favor of the existence of God is the fine-tuning argument. I also like certain versions of the cosmological argument, but I don't think that they're as strong as the fine-tuning argument. Traditional versions of the argument from design are, I think failures (although I can understand why they were formerly found plausible). And it seems to me that ontological arguments are as well; they don't provide any good reasons to think that their conclusion is true. Here, then, I present a version of the fine-tuning argument and explain why although I think it is somewhat strong, I also think that it doesn't provide any good reason to think that its conclusion is true.
Strictly speaking, the fine-tuning argument I will present isn't an argument for the conclusion that God exists. Instead, it is an argument for the conclusion that Theism* is true:
Theism* (T*): There is one and only one omnipotent (i.e., all-powerful), omniscient (i.e., all-knowing), omnibenevolent (i.e., all-good), creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent.
It will be helpful to define the terms that appear in this statement of (T*) (and offer some clarificatory remarks). I do so as follows:
x is omnipotent if and only if for all actions A, if there could be something with the ability to perform A, then x has the ability to perform A.
x is omniscient if and only if x knows every truth.
x is omnibenevolent if and only if no one could be better than x.
(We often rank people as better or worse than others. For instance, I am better than Hitler but I am worse than Ghandi. When we say that something is omnibenevolent, we're saying that no matter what, nothing can be better than it is.)
x is creative if and only if every contingent existent depends on x for its existence.
(x is a contingent existent if and only if x could have not existed. For instance, I am a contingent existent. I could have not existed. After all, if my parents hadn't engaged in certain activities, I would not have existed, and my parents could have not engaged in those activities.)
x is wholly immaterial if and only if (i) x is not a material object and (ii) none of x's parts are material objects.
x is a necessary existent if and only if x is not a contingent existent.
(Whereas I am a contingent existent, since I could have not existed, a necessary existent must have existed. If something is a necessary existent, it's simply impossible for it not to exist.)
With these preliminaries out of the way, I now turn to stating the fine-tuning argument:
The Fine-Tuning Argument
1. The fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe are within the very narrow range required for life to exist.
2. If (1), then something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe.
3. If something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe, then (T*) is true.
4. Therefore, (T*) is true
Why think that the premises of this argument are true? Here are reasons to think that each premise is true:
Explanation of the Fine-Tuning Argument
Premise (1): Recent work in physics has shown that this premise is true. For instance, it has shown that life couldn't exist if the strong nuclear force were stronger or weaker by 5%, or if gravity were just a little stronger or weaker, or if the electromagnetic force were slightly stronger or weaker. Furthermore, it has also shown that if there were slightly more matter at the beginning of the universe, the universe would have recollapsed very soon after the Big Bang and so life would not have existed, and that if there were slightly less matter at the beginning of the universe, the universe would have expanded too quickly for complex molecules to form and so life would not have existed. Thus, there is a very narrow range of the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe required for life to exist. But life does exist, so the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe is within that very narrow range. Therefore, premise (1) is true.
Premise (2): Suppose that (1) is true; that is, suppose that the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe are within the very narrow range required for life to exist. (From now on, I will abbreviate 'the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe' as 'the fundamental physical parameters'.) Then either something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters or the fundamental physical parameters acquired their values by chance. There is no third alternative. However, it is much more likely that something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters than that they acquired their values by chance. After all, it is very unlikely that the fundamental physical parameters would be within the very narrow range required for life to exist if they acquired their values by chance. On the other hand, it is pretty likely that they would be in that range if something that wanted life to exist set them up. Therefore, if (1), then something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters; that is, premise (2) is true.
Premise (3): Suppose that something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters. Call that being "the setter-upper". We seem to be able to infer a lot about what features the setter-upper has from the fact that the setter-upper set up the fundamental physical parameters. For instance, the setter-upper is creative, since every contingent existent depends on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence and the fundamental physical parameters depend on the setter-upper. It follows that every contingent existent depends on the setter-upper for its existence, and thus the setter-upper is creative. Furthermore, since the setter-upper set up the fundamental physical parameters, it does not depend on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence. Thus, the setter-upper is a necessary existent (since every contingent existent depends on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence) and the setter-upper is wholly immaterial (since every material object depends on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence). The setter-upper, then, is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent. In addition, the setter-upper had the ability to set up the fundamental physical parameters and is thus omnipotent, the setter-upper knew how to set up the fundamental physical parameters and is thus omniscient, and the setter-upper wanted life to exist and is thus omnibenevolent. So, the setter-upper is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent. And the setter-upper is clearly the only thing with those properties. Therefore, if something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters, then (T*) is true; that is, premise (3) is true.
I have now stated the Fine-Tuning Argument and given reasons to think that each of its premises is true. Since the Fine-Tuning Argument is valid, if the reasons given to think that each of its premises are true are good reasons, then we have good reasons to think that its conclusion is true. The next question to consider, then, is whether the reasons given to think that the premises of the Fine-Tuning Argument are true are in fact good reasons. I will argue that they are not:
Objections to the Fine-Tuning Argument
Objection #1: There is no good reason to think that premise (2) is true. Throughout the Fine-Tuning Argument, it is assumed that there is only one universe. But there is no good reason to think that's true. Because of this, there is no good reason to think that the only alternatives are that something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters or that the fundamental physical parameters acquired their values by chance. Perhaps instead for any values the fundamental physical parameters might have, there is a universe in which they have those values. On this alternative, however, it is very likely that there is a universe in which the fundamental physical parameters are within the very narrow range required for life to exist.
Objection #2: There is no good reason to think that premise (2) is true. Here is another alternative on which it is pretty likely that the fundamental physical parameters would be in the very narrow range required for life to exist: Something obsessed with the values that the fundamental physical parameters in fact have set up the fundamental physical parameters. In fact, there are many motivations that something that set up the fundamental physical parameters might have that would make it pretty likely that they'd be in the very narrow range required for life to exist.
Objection #3: There is no good reason to think that premise (3) is true. Although there is good reason to think that if something set up the fundamental physical parameters, then it is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent, there is no good reason to think that it is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. For although it clearly had the ability to set up the fundamental physical parameters, perhaps it has no other abilities; although it knew how to set up the fundamental physical parameters, perhaps it has no other knowledge; and although it wants life to exist, perhaps it only wants life to exist because it likes it when things die painful deaths and knows this is impossible unless life exists (and thus it is not omnibenevolent).
These objections show that the Fine-Tuning Argument doesn't provide good reasons to think that (T*) is true. However, it does seem that it provides good reason to think that the following is true:
(FTC) Either (i) for any values the fundamental physical parameters might have, there is a universe in which they have those values, or (ii) there is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent that set up the fundamental physical parameters and that being has one of the motivations that make it pretty likely that the fundamental physical parameters would be in the very narrow range required for life to exist.
In fact, it seems to me that the Fine-Tuning Argument provides rather strong reasons to think that (FTC) is true.
A final question: Are there any reasons to think that clause (i) of (FTC) is true rather than clause (ii), or vice-versa? One reason to think that clause (i) is true rather than clause (ii) is that clause (ii) requires postulating a being of an unfamiliar sort; the beings with which we are familiar are not creative and wholly immaterial necessary existents that have set up the fundamental physical parameters. In contrast, clause (i) doesn't require us to postulate beings of an unfamiliar sort; it merely requires us to postulate universes, and we are all familiar with our universe. On the other hand, one reason to think that clause (ii) is true rather than clause (i) is that clause (i) requires us to postulate a universe for any values the fundamental physical parameters might have. So, since there are an infinite number of values that the fundamental physical parameters might have, it requires us to postulate an infinite number of universes. In contrast, clause (ii) requires us to postulate only one being.
Thus, there are reasons to prefer clause (i) to clause (ii) and there are reasons to prefer clause (ii) to clause (i). I am inclined to think that the reasons to prefer clause (ii) to clause (i) are somewhat stronger than the reasons to prefer clause (i) to clause (ii). Thus, I am inclined to think that in addition to providing rather strong reasons to think that (FTC) is true, the Fine-Tuning Argument also provides some (rather weak) reason to think that the following is true:
(FTC*): There is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent that set up the fundamental physical parameters and that has one of the motivations that make it pretty likely that the fundamental physical parameters would be in the very narrow range required for life to exist.
Strictly speaking, the fine-tuning argument I will present isn't an argument for the conclusion that God exists. Instead, it is an argument for the conclusion that Theism* is true:
Theism* (T*): There is one and only one omnipotent (i.e., all-powerful), omniscient (i.e., all-knowing), omnibenevolent (i.e., all-good), creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent.
It will be helpful to define the terms that appear in this statement of (T*) (and offer some clarificatory remarks). I do so as follows:
x is omnipotent if and only if for all actions A, if there could be something with the ability to perform A, then x has the ability to perform A.
x is omniscient if and only if x knows every truth.
x is omnibenevolent if and only if no one could be better than x.
(We often rank people as better or worse than others. For instance, I am better than Hitler but I am worse than Ghandi. When we say that something is omnibenevolent, we're saying that no matter what, nothing can be better than it is.)
x is creative if and only if every contingent existent depends on x for its existence.
(x is a contingent existent if and only if x could have not existed. For instance, I am a contingent existent. I could have not existed. After all, if my parents hadn't engaged in certain activities, I would not have existed, and my parents could have not engaged in those activities.)
x is wholly immaterial if and only if (i) x is not a material object and (ii) none of x's parts are material objects.
x is a necessary existent if and only if x is not a contingent existent.
(Whereas I am a contingent existent, since I could have not existed, a necessary existent must have existed. If something is a necessary existent, it's simply impossible for it not to exist.)
With these preliminaries out of the way, I now turn to stating the fine-tuning argument:
The Fine-Tuning Argument
1. The fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe are within the very narrow range required for life to exist.
2. If (1), then something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe.
3. If something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe, then (T*) is true.
4. Therefore, (T*) is true
Why think that the premises of this argument are true? Here are reasons to think that each premise is true:
Explanation of the Fine-Tuning Argument
Premise (1): Recent work in physics has shown that this premise is true. For instance, it has shown that life couldn't exist if the strong nuclear force were stronger or weaker by 5%, or if gravity were just a little stronger or weaker, or if the electromagnetic force were slightly stronger or weaker. Furthermore, it has also shown that if there were slightly more matter at the beginning of the universe, the universe would have recollapsed very soon after the Big Bang and so life would not have existed, and that if there were slightly less matter at the beginning of the universe, the universe would have expanded too quickly for complex molecules to form and so life would not have existed. Thus, there is a very narrow range of the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe required for life to exist. But life does exist, so the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe is within that very narrow range. Therefore, premise (1) is true.
Premise (2): Suppose that (1) is true; that is, suppose that the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe are within the very narrow range required for life to exist. (From now on, I will abbreviate 'the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe' as 'the fundamental physical parameters'.) Then either something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters or the fundamental physical parameters acquired their values by chance. There is no third alternative. However, it is much more likely that something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters than that they acquired their values by chance. After all, it is very unlikely that the fundamental physical parameters would be within the very narrow range required for life to exist if they acquired their values by chance. On the other hand, it is pretty likely that they would be in that range if something that wanted life to exist set them up. Therefore, if (1), then something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters; that is, premise (2) is true.
Premise (3): Suppose that something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters. Call that being "the setter-upper". We seem to be able to infer a lot about what features the setter-upper has from the fact that the setter-upper set up the fundamental physical parameters. For instance, the setter-upper is creative, since every contingent existent depends on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence and the fundamental physical parameters depend on the setter-upper. It follows that every contingent existent depends on the setter-upper for its existence, and thus the setter-upper is creative. Furthermore, since the setter-upper set up the fundamental physical parameters, it does not depend on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence. Thus, the setter-upper is a necessary existent (since every contingent existent depends on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence) and the setter-upper is wholly immaterial (since every material object depends on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence). The setter-upper, then, is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent. In addition, the setter-upper had the ability to set up the fundamental physical parameters and is thus omnipotent, the setter-upper knew how to set up the fundamental physical parameters and is thus omniscient, and the setter-upper wanted life to exist and is thus omnibenevolent. So, the setter-upper is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent. And the setter-upper is clearly the only thing with those properties. Therefore, if something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters, then (T*) is true; that is, premise (3) is true.
I have now stated the Fine-Tuning Argument and given reasons to think that each of its premises is true. Since the Fine-Tuning Argument is valid, if the reasons given to think that each of its premises are true are good reasons, then we have good reasons to think that its conclusion is true. The next question to consider, then, is whether the reasons given to think that the premises of the Fine-Tuning Argument are true are in fact good reasons. I will argue that they are not:
Objections to the Fine-Tuning Argument
Objection #1: There is no good reason to think that premise (2) is true. Throughout the Fine-Tuning Argument, it is assumed that there is only one universe. But there is no good reason to think that's true. Because of this, there is no good reason to think that the only alternatives are that something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters or that the fundamental physical parameters acquired their values by chance. Perhaps instead for any values the fundamental physical parameters might have, there is a universe in which they have those values. On this alternative, however, it is very likely that there is a universe in which the fundamental physical parameters are within the very narrow range required for life to exist.
Objection #2: There is no good reason to think that premise (2) is true. Here is another alternative on which it is pretty likely that the fundamental physical parameters would be in the very narrow range required for life to exist: Something obsessed with the values that the fundamental physical parameters in fact have set up the fundamental physical parameters. In fact, there are many motivations that something that set up the fundamental physical parameters might have that would make it pretty likely that they'd be in the very narrow range required for life to exist.
Objection #3: There is no good reason to think that premise (3) is true. Although there is good reason to think that if something set up the fundamental physical parameters, then it is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent, there is no good reason to think that it is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. For although it clearly had the ability to set up the fundamental physical parameters, perhaps it has no other abilities; although it knew how to set up the fundamental physical parameters, perhaps it has no other knowledge; and although it wants life to exist, perhaps it only wants life to exist because it likes it when things die painful deaths and knows this is impossible unless life exists (and thus it is not omnibenevolent).
These objections show that the Fine-Tuning Argument doesn't provide good reasons to think that (T*) is true. However, it does seem that it provides good reason to think that the following is true:
(FTC) Either (i) for any values the fundamental physical parameters might have, there is a universe in which they have those values, or (ii) there is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent that set up the fundamental physical parameters and that being has one of the motivations that make it pretty likely that the fundamental physical parameters would be in the very narrow range required for life to exist.
In fact, it seems to me that the Fine-Tuning Argument provides rather strong reasons to think that (FTC) is true.
A final question: Are there any reasons to think that clause (i) of (FTC) is true rather than clause (ii), or vice-versa? One reason to think that clause (i) is true rather than clause (ii) is that clause (ii) requires postulating a being of an unfamiliar sort; the beings with which we are familiar are not creative and wholly immaterial necessary existents that have set up the fundamental physical parameters. In contrast, clause (i) doesn't require us to postulate beings of an unfamiliar sort; it merely requires us to postulate universes, and we are all familiar with our universe. On the other hand, one reason to think that clause (ii) is true rather than clause (i) is that clause (i) requires us to postulate a universe for any values the fundamental physical parameters might have. So, since there are an infinite number of values that the fundamental physical parameters might have, it requires us to postulate an infinite number of universes. In contrast, clause (ii) requires us to postulate only one being.
Thus, there are reasons to prefer clause (i) to clause (ii) and there are reasons to prefer clause (ii) to clause (i). I am inclined to think that the reasons to prefer clause (ii) to clause (i) are somewhat stronger than the reasons to prefer clause (i) to clause (ii). Thus, I am inclined to think that in addition to providing rather strong reasons to think that (FTC) is true, the Fine-Tuning Argument also provides some (rather weak) reason to think that the following is true:
(FTC*): There is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent that set up the fundamental physical parameters and that has one of the motivations that make it pretty likely that the fundamental physical parameters would be in the very narrow range required for life to exist.
posted by Greg at 10:10 AM
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