The Simple Argument from Evil
In my last post, I explained why the Fine-Tuning Argument (which I take to be the strongest argument in favor of Theism*) doesn't provide any good reason to think that Theism* is true. This is important because Theism* captures one of the most central beliefs of most Western theists: most Western theists think that there is one and only one omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent--namely, God.
In this post and in a forthcoming post I will explain why I think that there are good reasons to deny Theism*. I will focus on arguments from evil, the most common sort of argument against Theism*. In this post, I will present a simple argument from evil and explain why it is best to modify this argument. Then, in my post entitled "The Sophisticated Argument from Evil", I will formulate a more sophisticated argument from evil and explain why I think that it provides good reasons to think that Theism* is false.
Without further ado, the argument I will focus on in this post can be formulated as follows:
The Simple Argument from Evil
1. If there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen.
2. Bad things sometimes happen.
3. Therefore, there is nothing that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
4. If (3), then (T*) is false.
5. Therefore, (T*) is false.
Why think that the premises of this argument are true? Here are reasons to think that they are:
Explanation of the Simple Argument from Evil
Premise (1): Suppose that there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Call it 'Omni'. Then every bad thing must fall into one of the following four categories: (a) bad things that Omni prevents, (b) bad things that someone other than Omni prevents, (c) bad things that no one prevents but that nevertheless don't happen, or (d) bad things that no one prevents and that happen. Now clearly none of the bad things in category (c) happen. Furthermore, none of the bad things in categories (a) and (b) happen either, since every bad thing in these categories is prevented and if a bad thing is prevented, then it doesn't happen. Thus, if bad things sometimes happen, those bad things are in category (d). But there are no bad things in category (d). For if there were, then Omni would want them not to happen (since Omni is omnibenevolent and thus doesn't want any bad things to happen), Omni would know that they will happen unless Omni prevents them (since Omni, being omniscient, would know that no one other than Omni will prevent them and that they will happen unless someone prevents them), and Omni would have the ability to prevent them (since Omni is omnipotent). However, if Omni wants something not to happen, knows that it will happen unless Omni prevents it, and has the ability to prevent it, then Omni prevents it. It follows that there are no bad things in category (d), since if there were, Omni would prevent them and so they would be in category (a) rather than category (d). We showed before, however, that if bad things sometimes happen, those bad things are in category (d). But we have just shown that there are no bad things in category (d). We can conclude, then, that bad things never happen. Therefore, if there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen; that is, premise (1) is true.
Premise (2): Consider people being burned alive in houses set ablaze by lightning, children drowning in ponds, and fawns suffering painful deaths in forest fires. Worse, consider the Holocaust. These are all bad things that have happened. Therefore, bad things sometimes happen; that is, premise (2) is true.
Premise (3): Premise (3) is a subconclusion; if premises (1) and (2) are true, then premise (3) must also be true. So we needn't give any independent reasons to think that premise (3) is true; the reasons given to think that premises (1) and (2) are true are also reasons to think that premise (3) is true.
Premise (4): Suppose that (3) is true; that is, suppose that there is nothing that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Then there can't be one and only one omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent, since if there is nothing that has certain properties, then there isn't one and only one thing that has those properties and besides. Therefore, if (3), then (T*) is false; that is, premise (4) is true.
Having presented the Simple Argument from Evil and given reasons to think that its premises are true, I now turn to explaining why it is best to modify the argument. Before doing so, however, let me note that premises (2) and (4) seem beyond reproach. When explaining why it is best to modify the argument, then, I will focus on premise (1).
Premise (1) says, remember, that if there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen. I have given reasons to think that this premise is true above. However, some may have doubts about it. To see why these doubts might arise, pretend that there's someone, Alice, who is omnibenevolent; that is, pretend that no one could be better than Alice. But don't assume anything about Alice's abilities or about Alice's knowledge; in particular, don't assume that Alice is omnipotent or that Alice is omniscient.
Given that Alice is omnibenevolent, which bad things will Alice prevent? Well, clearly Alice won't prevent bad things that she doesn't have the ability to prevent. Nor will she prevent bad things that she knows won't happen whether or not she prevents them. What about bad things that she doesn't know will happen unless she prevents them? She might not prevent those either. Are there any other bad things she might not prevent? Yes. Perhaps there are bad things that she can't prevent without thereby ensuring that something as bad or worse will happen, in which case she might not prevent those things. Furthermore, perhaps there are bad things that she can't prevent without thereby ensuring that something as good as they are bad or better won't happen. And she might not prevent these either.
Suppose, however, that b is a bad thing meeting the following conditions: (i) b will happen unless Alice prevents b, (ii) Alice knows that b will happen unless Alice prevents b, (iii) Alice is able to prevent b, (iv) Alice is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as bad as or worse than b will happen, and (v) Alice is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as good as b is bad or better won't happen. Given that Alice is omnibenevolent, it seems as though Alice would prevent b in these circumstances.
These considerations suggest the following principle:
A Principle about Omnibenevolence (PO): If x is omnibenevolent and b is a bad thing that will happen unless x prevents b, then: if x knows that b will happen unless x prevents b, x is able to prevent b, x is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as bad as or worse than b will happen, and x is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as good as b is bad or better won't happen, then x prevents b.
Let's now apply (PO) to the case of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being. Since such a being is omniscient, the clause that reads "x knows that b will happen unless x prevents b" is redundant and thus may be removed. Furthermore, since such a being is omnipotent and thus has every ability that something could have, the other clauses can be modified. The resulting principle is:
A Principle about Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Omnibenevolence (POOO): If x is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent and b is a bad thing that will happen unless x prevents b, then: if there could be something with the ability to prevent b, there could be something with the ability to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as bad as or worse than b will happen, and there could be something with the ability to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as good as b is bad or better won't happen, then x prevents b.
We can now see why it is best to modify the Simple Argument from Evil. Premise (2) of the Simple Argument from Evil claims that if there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen. The idea is that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being would have the power, knowledge, and desire necessary to ensure that no bad things ever happen. But consider (POOO). It does not ensure this. Perhaps some of the bad things that happen are bad things that nothing could have the ability to prevent, or that nothing could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equally bad or worse thing will happen, or that nothing could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equal or greater good won't happen. (POOO) does not ensure that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being would prevent such things.
Thus, in order to show that premise (2) of the Simple Argument from Evil is true, we would have to show that every bad thing that happens is one that something could have the ability to prevent, is one that something could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equally bad or worse thing will happen, and is one that something could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equal or greater good won't happen. Perhaps this could be done. But notice that it would take a lot of work. Also notice this work is superfluous. If it can be shown that just some of the bad things that happen meet the conditions set out in the first sentence of this paragraph, it will have been shown that there is nothing that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Thus, the Simple Argument from Evil should be modified to focus on whether bad things that meet the conditions set out in the first sentence ever happen. Otherwise a lot of unnecessary work would be required.
In this post and in a forthcoming post I will explain why I think that there are good reasons to deny Theism*. I will focus on arguments from evil, the most common sort of argument against Theism*. In this post, I will present a simple argument from evil and explain why it is best to modify this argument. Then, in my post entitled "The Sophisticated Argument from Evil", I will formulate a more sophisticated argument from evil and explain why I think that it provides good reasons to think that Theism* is false.
Without further ado, the argument I will focus on in this post can be formulated as follows:
The Simple Argument from Evil
1. If there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen.
2. Bad things sometimes happen.
3. Therefore, there is nothing that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
4. If (3), then (T*) is false.
5. Therefore, (T*) is false.
Why think that the premises of this argument are true? Here are reasons to think that they are:
Explanation of the Simple Argument from Evil
Premise (1): Suppose that there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Call it 'Omni'. Then every bad thing must fall into one of the following four categories: (a) bad things that Omni prevents, (b) bad things that someone other than Omni prevents, (c) bad things that no one prevents but that nevertheless don't happen, or (d) bad things that no one prevents and that happen. Now clearly none of the bad things in category (c) happen. Furthermore, none of the bad things in categories (a) and (b) happen either, since every bad thing in these categories is prevented and if a bad thing is prevented, then it doesn't happen. Thus, if bad things sometimes happen, those bad things are in category (d). But there are no bad things in category (d). For if there were, then Omni would want them not to happen (since Omni is omnibenevolent and thus doesn't want any bad things to happen), Omni would know that they will happen unless Omni prevents them (since Omni, being omniscient, would know that no one other than Omni will prevent them and that they will happen unless someone prevents them), and Omni would have the ability to prevent them (since Omni is omnipotent). However, if Omni wants something not to happen, knows that it will happen unless Omni prevents it, and has the ability to prevent it, then Omni prevents it. It follows that there are no bad things in category (d), since if there were, Omni would prevent them and so they would be in category (a) rather than category (d). We showed before, however, that if bad things sometimes happen, those bad things are in category (d). But we have just shown that there are no bad things in category (d). We can conclude, then, that bad things never happen. Therefore, if there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen; that is, premise (1) is true.
Premise (2): Consider people being burned alive in houses set ablaze by lightning, children drowning in ponds, and fawns suffering painful deaths in forest fires. Worse, consider the Holocaust. These are all bad things that have happened. Therefore, bad things sometimes happen; that is, premise (2) is true.
Premise (3): Premise (3) is a subconclusion; if premises (1) and (2) are true, then premise (3) must also be true. So we needn't give any independent reasons to think that premise (3) is true; the reasons given to think that premises (1) and (2) are true are also reasons to think that premise (3) is true.
Premise (4): Suppose that (3) is true; that is, suppose that there is nothing that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Then there can't be one and only one omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent, since if there is nothing that has certain properties, then there isn't one and only one thing that has those properties and besides. Therefore, if (3), then (T*) is false; that is, premise (4) is true.
Having presented the Simple Argument from Evil and given reasons to think that its premises are true, I now turn to explaining why it is best to modify the argument. Before doing so, however, let me note that premises (2) and (4) seem beyond reproach. When explaining why it is best to modify the argument, then, I will focus on premise (1).
Premise (1) says, remember, that if there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen. I have given reasons to think that this premise is true above. However, some may have doubts about it. To see why these doubts might arise, pretend that there's someone, Alice, who is omnibenevolent; that is, pretend that no one could be better than Alice. But don't assume anything about Alice's abilities or about Alice's knowledge; in particular, don't assume that Alice is omnipotent or that Alice is omniscient.
Given that Alice is omnibenevolent, which bad things will Alice prevent? Well, clearly Alice won't prevent bad things that she doesn't have the ability to prevent. Nor will she prevent bad things that she knows won't happen whether or not she prevents them. What about bad things that she doesn't know will happen unless she prevents them? She might not prevent those either. Are there any other bad things she might not prevent? Yes. Perhaps there are bad things that she can't prevent without thereby ensuring that something as bad or worse will happen, in which case she might not prevent those things. Furthermore, perhaps there are bad things that she can't prevent without thereby ensuring that something as good as they are bad or better won't happen. And she might not prevent these either.
Suppose, however, that b is a bad thing meeting the following conditions: (i) b will happen unless Alice prevents b, (ii) Alice knows that b will happen unless Alice prevents b, (iii) Alice is able to prevent b, (iv) Alice is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as bad as or worse than b will happen, and (v) Alice is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as good as b is bad or better won't happen. Given that Alice is omnibenevolent, it seems as though Alice would prevent b in these circumstances.
These considerations suggest the following principle:
A Principle about Omnibenevolence (PO): If x is omnibenevolent and b is a bad thing that will happen unless x prevents b, then: if x knows that b will happen unless x prevents b, x is able to prevent b, x is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as bad as or worse than b will happen, and x is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as good as b is bad or better won't happen, then x prevents b.
Let's now apply (PO) to the case of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being. Since such a being is omniscient, the clause that reads "x knows that b will happen unless x prevents b" is redundant and thus may be removed. Furthermore, since such a being is omnipotent and thus has every ability that something could have, the other clauses can be modified. The resulting principle is:
A Principle about Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Omnibenevolence (POOO): If x is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent and b is a bad thing that will happen unless x prevents b, then: if there could be something with the ability to prevent b, there could be something with the ability to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as bad as or worse than b will happen, and there could be something with the ability to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as good as b is bad or better won't happen, then x prevents b.
We can now see why it is best to modify the Simple Argument from Evil. Premise (2) of the Simple Argument from Evil claims that if there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen. The idea is that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being would have the power, knowledge, and desire necessary to ensure that no bad things ever happen. But consider (POOO). It does not ensure this. Perhaps some of the bad things that happen are bad things that nothing could have the ability to prevent, or that nothing could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equally bad or worse thing will happen, or that nothing could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equal or greater good won't happen. (POOO) does not ensure that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being would prevent such things.
Thus, in order to show that premise (2) of the Simple Argument from Evil is true, we would have to show that every bad thing that happens is one that something could have the ability to prevent, is one that something could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equally bad or worse thing will happen, and is one that something could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equal or greater good won't happen. Perhaps this could be done. But notice that it would take a lot of work. Also notice this work is superfluous. If it can be shown that just some of the bad things that happen meet the conditions set out in the first sentence of this paragraph, it will have been shown that there is nothing that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Thus, the Simple Argument from Evil should be modified to focus on whether bad things that meet the conditions set out in the first sentence ever happen. Otherwise a lot of unnecessary work would be required.
posted by Greg at 11:16 AM
1 Comments:
Hi, how can I contact you?
I want to start, a list of philosophy BLOGS. A small presentation of the thing, a library or address book. But one question I don't know is, how to contact people through blogs, I'm not familiar with this medium.
If time permits, I want you to make a post here,
http://dissidentphilosophy.lifediscussion.net/conversation-f8/
It will get stickied and start a list of philosophy blogs. You could write a small intro too, like "Here is a index and library of PHILOSOPHY blogs ...."
Already an index of BBS is here,
http://dissidentphilosophy.lifediscussion.net/conversation-f8/the-community-of-ephilosophers-philosophy-bbs-sites-t9.htm
Kind regards,
- Niki
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