A Thanksgiving Day Prayer

Dear God (if a God there be),

Tomorrow many Americans, including me, will partake of an abundant Thanksgiving Day meal. Very likely many of them will be offering prayers of thanks to you. I, however, will not. Sorry.

It's not that I won't enjoy the meal and it's not that I'm unhappy with the circumstances in life that allow me the resources to partake in it. Quite the contrary.

Instead, it's the fact that I know that Thanksgiving is more than a day on which I receive unusually hearty portions. It is also a day like any other; it is a day on which 15,000 or more children starve to death.

Forgive me for thinking this, but this suggests to me that you're not quite the great guy many people think you are. Maybe you simply don't care about the death of these children, or maybe you're unable to prevent it, or maybe you simply didn't know about it until I told you. I'm not sure which.

What I am sure about is this. If the price of admission to a universe in which I have food in abundance on Thanksgiving Day is the death of starvation of 15,000 kids, I would gladly return the ticket.

And if that's rebellion, so be it. Amen.

The Simple Argument from Evil

In my last post, I explained why the Fine-Tuning Argument (which I take to be the strongest argument in favor of Theism*) doesn't provide any good reason to think that Theism* is true. This is important because Theism* captures one of the most central beliefs of most Western theists: most Western theists think that there is one and only one omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent--namely, God.

In this post and in a forthcoming post I will explain why I think that there are good reasons to deny Theism*. I will focus on arguments from evil, the most common sort of argument against Theism*. In this post, I will present a simple argument from evil and explain why it is best to modify this argument. Then, in my post entitled "The Sophisticated Argument from Evil", I will formulate a more sophisticated argument from evil and explain why I think that it provides good reasons to think that Theism* is false.

Without further ado, the argument I will focus on in this post can be formulated as follows:

The Simple Argument from Evil
1. If there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen.
2. Bad things sometimes happen.
3. Therefore, there is nothing that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
4. If (3), then (T*) is false.
5. Therefore, (T*) is false.

Why think that the premises of this argument are true? Here are reasons to think that they are:

Explanation of the Simple Argument from Evil
Premise (1): Suppose that there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Call it 'Omni'. Then every bad thing must fall into one of the following four categories: (a) bad things that Omni prevents, (b) bad things that someone other than Omni prevents, (c) bad things that no one prevents but that nevertheless don't happen, or (d) bad things that no one prevents and that happen. Now clearly none of the bad things in category (c) happen. Furthermore, none of the bad things in categories (a) and (b) happen either, since every bad thing in these categories is prevented and if a bad thing is prevented, then it doesn't happen. Thus, if bad things sometimes happen, those bad things are in category (d). But there are no bad things in category (d). For if there were, then Omni would want them not to happen (since Omni is omnibenevolent and thus doesn't want any bad things to happen), Omni would know that they will happen unless Omni prevents them (since Omni, being omniscient, would know that no one other than Omni will prevent them and that they will happen unless someone prevents them), and Omni would have the ability to prevent them (since Omni is omnipotent). However, if Omni wants something not to happen, knows that it will happen unless Omni prevents it, and has the ability to prevent it, then Omni prevents it. It follows that there are no bad things in category (d), since if there were, Omni would prevent them and so they would be in category (a) rather than category (d). We showed before, however, that if bad things sometimes happen, those bad things are in category (d). But we have just shown that there are no bad things in category (d). We can conclude, then, that bad things never happen. Therefore, if there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen; that is, premise (1) is true.

Premise (2): Consider people being burned alive in houses set ablaze by lightning, children drowning in ponds, and fawns suffering painful deaths in forest fires. Worse, consider the Holocaust. These are all bad things that have happened. Therefore, bad things sometimes happen; that is, premise (2) is true.

Premise (3): Premise (3) is a subconclusion; if premises (1) and (2) are true, then premise (3) must also be true. So we needn't give any independent reasons to think that premise (3) is true; the reasons given to think that premises (1) and (2) are true are also reasons to think that premise (3) is true.

Premise (4): Suppose that (3) is true; that is, suppose that there is nothing that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Then there can't be one and only one omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent, since if there is nothing that has certain properties, then there isn't one and only one thing that has those properties and besides. Therefore, if (3), then (T*) is false; that is, premise (4) is true.

Having presented the Simple Argument from Evil and given reasons to think that its premises are true, I now turn to explaining why it is best to modify the argument. Before doing so, however, let me note that premises (2) and (4) seem beyond reproach. When explaining why it is best to modify the argument, then, I will focus on premise (1).

Premise (1) says, remember, that if there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen. I have given reasons to think that this premise is true above. However, some may have doubts about it. To see why these doubts might arise, pretend that there's someone, Alice, who is omnibenevolent; that is, pretend that no one could be better than Alice. But don't assume anything about Alice's abilities or about Alice's knowledge; in particular, don't assume that Alice is omnipotent or that Alice is omniscient.

Given that Alice is omnibenevolent, which bad things will Alice prevent? Well, clearly Alice won't prevent bad things that she doesn't have the ability to prevent. Nor will she prevent bad things that she knows won't happen whether or not she prevents them. What about bad things that she doesn't know will happen unless she prevents them? She might not prevent those either. Are there any other bad things she might not prevent? Yes. Perhaps there are bad things that she can't prevent without thereby ensuring that something as bad or worse will happen, in which case she might not prevent those things. Furthermore, perhaps there are bad things that she can't prevent without thereby ensuring that something as good as they are bad or better won't happen. And she might not prevent these either.

Suppose, however, that b is a bad thing meeting the following conditions: (i) b will happen unless Alice prevents b, (ii) Alice knows that b will happen unless Alice prevents b, (iii) Alice is able to prevent b, (iv) Alice is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as bad as or worse than b will happen, and (v) Alice is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as good as b is bad or better won't happen. Given that Alice is omnibenevolent, it seems as though Alice would prevent b in these circumstances.

These considerations suggest the following principle:

A Principle about Omnibenevolence (PO): If x is omnibenevolent and b is a bad thing that will happen unless x prevents b, then: if x knows that b will happen unless x prevents b, x is able to prevent b, x is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as bad as or worse than b will happen, and x is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as good as b is bad or better won't happen, then x prevents b.

Let's now apply (PO) to the case of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being. Since such a being is omniscient, the clause that reads "x knows that b will happen unless x prevents b" is redundant and thus may be removed. Furthermore, since such a being is omnipotent and thus has every ability that something could have, the other clauses can be modified. The resulting principle is:

A Principle about Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Omnibenevolence (POOO): If x is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent and b is a bad thing that will happen unless x prevents b, then: if there could be something with the ability to prevent b, there could be something with the ability to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as bad as or worse than b will happen, and there could be something with the ability to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as good as b is bad or better won't happen, then x prevents b.

We can now see why it is best to modify the Simple Argument from Evil. Premise (2) of the Simple Argument from Evil claims that if there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen. The idea is that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being would have the power, knowledge, and desire necessary to ensure that no bad things ever happen. But consider (POOO). It does not ensure this. Perhaps some of the bad things that happen are bad things that nothing could have the ability to prevent, or that nothing could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equally bad or worse thing will happen, or that nothing could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equal or greater good won't happen. (POOO) does not ensure that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being would prevent such things.

Thus, in order to show that premise (2) of the Simple Argument from Evil is true, we would have to show that every bad thing that happens is one that something could have the ability to prevent, is one that something could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equally bad or worse thing will happen, and is one that something could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equal or greater good won't happen. Perhaps this could be done. But notice that it would take a lot of work. Also notice this work is superfluous. If it can be shown that just some of the bad things that happen meet the conditions set out in the first sentence of this paragraph, it will have been shown that there is nothing that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Thus, the Simple Argument from Evil should be modified to focus on whether bad things that meet the conditions set out in the first sentence ever happen. Otherwise a lot of unnecessary work would be required.

Fine-Tuning

In my opinion, the strongest argument in favor of the existence of God is the fine-tuning argument. I also like certain versions of the cosmological argument, but I don't think that they're as strong as the fine-tuning argument. Traditional versions of the argument from design are, I think failures (although I can understand why they were formerly found plausible). And it seems to me that ontological arguments are as well; they don't provide any good reasons to think that their conclusion is true. Here, then, I present a version of the fine-tuning argument and explain why although I think it is somewhat strong, I also think that it doesn't provide any good reason to think that its conclusion is true.

Strictly speaking, the fine-tuning argument I will present isn't an argument for the conclusion that God exists. Instead, it is an argument for the conclusion that Theism* is true:

Theism* (T*): There is one and only one omnipotent (i.e., all-powerful), omniscient (i.e., all-knowing), omnibenevolent (i.e., all-good), creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent.

It will be helpful to define the terms that appear in this statement of (T*) (and offer some clarificatory remarks). I do so as follows:

x is omnipotent if and only if for all actions A, if there could be something with the ability to perform A, then x has the ability to perform A.


x is omniscient if and only if x knows every truth.

x is omnibenevolent if and only if no one could be better than x.
(We often rank people as better or worse than others. For instance, I am better than Hitler but I am worse than Ghandi. When we say that something is omnibenevolent, we're saying that no matter what, nothing can be better than it is.)

x is creative if and only if every contingent existent depends on x for its existence.
(x is a contingent existent if and only if x could have not existed. For instance, I am a contingent existent. I could have not existed. After all, if my parents hadn't engaged in certain activities, I would not have existed, and my parents could have not engaged in those activities.)

x is wholly immaterial if and only if (i) x is not a material object and (ii) none of x's parts are material objects.

x is a necessary existent if and only if x is not a contingent existent.
(Whereas I am a contingent existent, since I could have not existed, a necessary existent must have existed. If something is a necessary existent, it's simply impossible for it not to exist.)

With these preliminaries out of the way, I now turn to stating the fine-tuning argument:

The Fine-Tuning Argument
1. The fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe are within the very narrow range required for life to exist.
2. If (1), then something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe.
3. If something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe, then (T*) is true.
4. Therefore, (T*) is true

Why think that the premises of this argument are true? Here are reasons to think that each premise is true:

Explanation of the Fine-Tuning Argument
Premise (1): Recent work in physics has shown that this premise is true. For instance, it has shown that life couldn't exist if the strong nuclear force were stronger or weaker by 5%, or if gravity were just a little stronger or weaker, or if the electromagnetic force were slightly stronger or weaker. Furthermore, it has also shown that if there were slightly more matter at the beginning of the universe, the universe would have recollapsed very soon after the Big Bang and so life would not have existed, and that if there were slightly less matter at the beginning of the universe, the universe would have expanded too quickly for complex molecules to form and so life would not have existed. Thus, there is a very narrow range of the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe required for life to exist. But life does exist, so the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe is within that very narrow range. Therefore, premise (1) is true.

Premise (2): Suppose that (1) is true; that is, suppose that the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe are within the very narrow range required for life to exist. (From now on, I will abbreviate 'the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe' as 'the fundamental physical parameters'.) Then either something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters or the fundamental physical parameters acquired their values by chance. There is no third alternative. However, it is much more likely that something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters than that they acquired their values by chance. After all, it is very unlikely that the fundamental physical parameters would be within the very narrow range required for life to exist if they acquired their values by chance. On the other hand, it is pretty likely that they would be in that range if something that wanted life to exist set them up. Therefore, if (1), then something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters; that is, premise (2) is true.

Premise (3): Suppose that something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters. Call that being "the setter-upper". We seem to be able to infer a lot about what features the setter-upper has from the fact that the setter-upper set up the fundamental physical parameters. For instance, the setter-upper is creative, since every contingent existent depends on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence and the fundamental physical parameters depend on the setter-upper. It follows that every contingent existent depends on the setter-upper for its existence, and thus the setter-upper is creative. Furthermore, since the setter-upper set up the fundamental physical parameters, it does not depend on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence. Thus, the setter-upper is a necessary existent (since every contingent existent depends on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence) and the setter-upper is wholly immaterial (since every material object depends on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence). The setter-upper, then, is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent. In addition, the setter-upper had the ability to set up the fundamental physical parameters and is thus omnipotent, the setter-upper knew how to set up the fundamental physical parameters and is thus omniscient, and the setter-upper wanted life to exist and is thus omnibenevolent. So, the setter-upper is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent. And the setter-upper is clearly the only thing with those properties. Therefore, if something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters, then (T*) is true; that is, premise (3) is true.

I have now stated the Fine-Tuning Argument and given reasons to think that each of its premises is true. Since the Fine-Tuning Argument is valid, if the reasons given to think that each of its premises are true are good reasons, then we have good reasons to think that its conclusion is true. The next question to consider, then, is whether the reasons given to think that the premises of the Fine-Tuning Argument are true are in fact good reasons. I will argue that they are not:

Objections to the Fine-Tuning Argument

Objection #1: There is no good reason to think that premise (2) is true. Throughout the Fine-Tuning Argument, it is assumed that there is only one universe. But there is no good reason to think that's true. Because of this, there is no good reason to think that the only alternatives are that something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters or that the fundamental physical parameters acquired their values by chance. Perhaps instead for any values the fundamental physical parameters might have, there is a universe in which they have those values. On this alternative, however, it is very likely that there is a universe in which the fundamental physical parameters are within the very narrow range required for life to exist.

Objection #2: There is no good reason to think that premise (2) is true. Here is another alternative on which it is pretty likely that the fundamental physical parameters would be in the very narrow range required for life to exist: Something obsessed with the values that the fundamental physical parameters in fact have set up the fundamental physical parameters. In fact, there are many motivations that something that set up the fundamental physical parameters might have that would make it pretty likely that they'd be in the very narrow range required for life to exist.

Objection #3: There is no good reason to think that premise (3) is true. Although there is good reason to think that if something set up the fundamental physical parameters, then it is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent, there is no good reason to think that it is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. For although it clearly had the ability to set up the fundamental physical parameters, perhaps it has no other abilities; although it knew how to set up the fundamental physical parameters, perhaps it has no other knowledge; and although it wants life to exist, perhaps it only wants life to exist because it likes it when things die painful deaths and knows this is impossible unless life exists (and thus it is not omnibenevolent).

These objections show that the Fine-Tuning Argument doesn't provide good reasons to think that (T*) is true. However, it does seem that it provides good reason to think that the following is true:

(FTC) Either (i) for any values the fundamental physical parameters might have, there is a universe in which they have those values, or (ii) there is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent that set up the fundamental physical parameters and that being has one of the motivations that make it pretty likely that the fundamental physical parameters would be in the very narrow range required for life to exist.

In fact, it seems to me that the Fine-Tuning Argument provides rather strong reasons to think that (FTC) is true.

A final question: Are there any reasons to think that clause (i) of (FTC) is true rather than clause (ii), or vice-versa? One reason to think that clause (i) is true rather than clause (ii) is that clause (ii) requires postulating a being of an unfamiliar sort; the beings with which we are familiar are not creative and wholly immaterial necessary existents that have set up the fundamental physical parameters. In contrast, clause (i) doesn't require us to postulate beings of an unfamiliar sort; it merely requires us to postulate universes, and we are all familiar with our universe. On the other hand, one reason to think that clause (ii) is true rather than clause (i) is that clause (i) requires us to postulate a universe for any values the fundamental physical parameters might have. So, since there are an infinite number of values that the fundamental physical parameters might have, it requires us to postulate an infinite number of universes. In contrast, clause (ii) requires us to postulate only one being.

Thus, there are reasons to prefer clause (i) to clause (ii) and there are reasons to prefer clause (ii) to clause (i). I am inclined to think that the reasons to prefer clause (ii) to clause (i) are somewhat stronger than the reasons to prefer clause (i) to clause (ii). Thus, I am inclined to think that in addition to providing rather strong reasons to think that (FTC) is true, the Fine-Tuning Argument also provides some (rather weak) reason to think that the following is true:

(FTC*): There is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent that set up the fundamental physical parameters and that has one of the motivations that make it pretty likely that the fundamental physical parameters would be in the very narrow range required for life to exist.

Death and Existence

In this post, I would like to consider the question of whether people sometimes continue to exist after they have died.

Let me first make some introductory remarks in an attempt to clarify this question. It appears that some things begin existing at one time and cease to exist at another time. Consider, for instance, the World Trade Center. The World Trade Center did not exist in 1700 and it does not exist in 2008. However, there were times between 1700 and 2008 when the World Trade Center existed. So it seems that the World Trade Center began to exist at some time between 1700 and 2008 and also ceased to exist at some (distinct) time between 1700 and 2008.


Similar remarks apply to living things. Consider any currently existing tree. That tree did not exist 1,000,000 years ago but it does exist today. So at some time between 1,000,000 years ago and today, that tree began to exist. Furthermore, if we were to cut down and burn the tree, it would not exist at the end of that process. Thus, there would be a time between now and the time at which the process has ended at which the tree ceased to exist.


But in addition to ceasing to exist, living things also die. For instance, if one takes a currently existing living tree, cuts it down, and burns it, then that tree will die at some point during that process.


Thus, for any living thing, we can consider the time that it dies and ask whether it also ceases to exist at that time. Thus, for instance, consider some tree that was actually cut down and burned at some point in the past and consider the time at which it died. We can ask whether it ceased to exist at that time in addition to dying at that time.

Similar remarks apply to people. People die. (My maternal grandmother, for instance, died.) So we can ask whether every person ceases to exist when he or she dies or whether instead some people continue to exist after they die.

I think that some people continue to exist after they die. In fact, I think that this is a relatively common view. However, my reasons for thinking that some people continue to exist after they die differ, I think, from the reasons that many others would give for thinking so. Let me explain.

As far as I can tell, many of those who think that some people continue to exist after they die think that this is so because they believe that certain traditional religious doctrines are true. In particular, they think that my maternal grandmother continued to exist after she died because she is now either in Heaven or in Hell (or in Purgatory). In addition, they think that the same is true of other people. In fact, many who accept these traditional religious doctrines think that every person continues to exist after he or she dies.

However, I reject the traditional religious views on which this reason for thinking that some people continue to exist after they die is based. I deny the existence of Heaven and Hell (and Purgatory) and so I think that no one who dies goes to those places.

My reasons for thinking that some people exist after they die are entirely non-religious. Here's why I think that some people continue to exist after they die. My maternal grandmother was a person. But my maternal grandmother was buried after she died. So my maternal grandmother did not cease to exist when she died. Thus, some people continue to exist after they die.

Here's a more formal presentation of my argument:
1. My maternal grandmother was buried after she died.
2. If my maternal grandmother was buried after she died, then some people continue to exist after they die.
3. Therefore, some people continue to exist after they die.
This argument is valid; that is, if claims (1) and (2) are true, then claim (3) must be true as well. So I will now turn to giving reasons to think that each of these claims is true.

Why think that (1) is true? Well, a few days after my maternal grandmother died, my father said "Your grandma is being buried tomorrow". And what my father said was true. But in order for what my father said to be true, it must be true that my maternal grandmother was buried the day after he said it. But that day was after my maternal grandmother died. Thus, my maternal grandmother was buried after she died.

It is easy to see that (2) is true as well. For my maternal grandmother could not have been buried at a time unless she existed at that time. However, if she had ceased to exist when she died, she would not have existed after she died. And my maternal grandmother was a person. Thus, if my maternal grandmother was buried after she died, then some people continue to exist after they die.

Here is a more formal statement of this reasoning in favor of (2). Suppose that my maternal grandmother was buried after she died. If my maternal grandmother was buried after she died, then my maternal grandmother existed after she died, since if she did not exist after she died, she couldn't have been buried then. Thus, my maternal grandmother existed after she died. But if my maternal grandmother existed after she died, then my maternal grandmother continued to exist after she died. Thus, my maternal grandmother continued to exist after she died. But my maternal grandmother was a person. Thus, some people continue to exist after they die. So, on the supposition that my maternal grandmother was buried after she died, some people continue to exist after they die. Therefore, if my maternal grandmother was buried after she died, then some people continue to exist after they die; that is, (2) is true.

In this post, I have offered an argument in favor of the conclusion that some people continue to exist after they have died. I have also given reasons to think that both of the claims made in support of that conclusion are true. Since the argument is valid, anyone who disagrees with the conclusion must also deny one of those claims and thus find fault with the reasons I gave to think that they are true. Furthermore, even those who agree with the conclusion may think that one of the claims made in support of the conclusion is false. So they too must find some fault with the reasons I gave to think that those claims are true. I fully expect that some people will think that the argument I have given is unsuccessful and that they will have objections to it. However, rather than addressing those objections here, I will wait until they are raised to respond to them.

[I should mention that my thinking on these matters has been greatly influenced by Fred Feldman's discussion of them in Chapter 6 of his book Confrontations with the Reaper. I highly recommend that chapter to anyone with an interest in the questions addressed in this post. In addition, I recommend the whole book to anyone interested in philosophical questions concerning life and death.]

The Philosophy of the Cool: Against the Subjectivist/Relativist Approach

Let's face it: Some things are cool, and others are not. And when I say that, I'm not talking about being cool to the touch. Rather, I'm using the word 'cool' in the way someone might if they said 'That movie was cool' or 'Rock 'n rool is cool'. Here I want to argue against a particular approach to ascriptions of coolness.

Many are likely to say that ascriptions of coolness are, in some sense "subjective" or "relative to taste". They might express their view by saying things like: 'What's cool for some people isn't cool for others' or 'One person might think that something is cool and another person might think that it isn't cool and both of them might be right'.

I think this view is probably false, just as I think that similar views concerning ethics and aesthetics are false. I want to explain why I reject this view by explaining why I reject particular ways of making it more precise. Unfortunately, I can't address every version of the view. But hopefully by addressing a few versions of the view and showing why they should be rejected, I can make it plausible that every version of the view should be rejected.

One version of the subjectivist/relativist view holds that whenever anyone uses the predicate 'is cool' to apply to something, that person is simply expressing some sort of approval of that thing. So, for instance, if I utter the sentence 'That movie is cool', referring to "Shaun of the Dead", it is just as though I had said 'Yay, "Shaun of the Dead"!'.

This version of the subjectivist/relativist view is analogous to expressivist views in ethics, and should be rejected for the same reasons. The main reason that such views should be rejected is that they conflict with obvious claims concerning disagreement. So, for instance, if I say 'That movie is cool' and you say 'That movie isn't cool' and we are both referring to "Shaun of the Dead", then we disagree. However, one cannot disagree with "Yay, "Shaun of the Dead"!", since one who says 'Yay, "Shaun of the Dead"!' is not making a claim and so you one cannot disagree with the claim made. Thus, since the view we are considering is one according to which it is just as though I had said 'Yay, "Shaun of the Dead"!' when I say 'That movie is cool', you do not disagree with me when you say 'That movie isn't cool'. Since you do disagree with me, this version of the subjectivist/relativist view is false.

A different version of the subjectivist/relativist view holds that 'is cool' functions a lot like words like 'I', which are commonly called 'indexicals'. When I say "I am hungry" and you say "I am hungry", what I say may be true while what you say is false (because I might be hungry even though you aren't). Similarly, according to this view, when I say 'That movie is cool' and you say 'That movie was cool' and we are both referring to "Shaun of the Dead", what I say may be true while what you say is false. And just as you would say something true in the example involving 'I' if you said 'I am not hungry', so too you would say something true in the example involving 'is cool' if you said 'That movie isn't cool'.

There are two makor problems with this version of the subjectivist/relativist view. One problem is that, again, it seems to conflict with obvious claims concerning disagreement. Just as you do not disagree with me when I say 'I am hungry' and you say 'I am not hungry', so too on this view when I say 'That movie is cool' and you say 'That movie isn't cool', you do not disagree with me. So, the view in question is false.

Another problem with the view has to do with reporting what others say. For instance, if you say 'I am hungry', I cannot correctly report what you say by saying 'You said that I am hungry' because you didn't say that I am hungry, you said that you are hungry. Instead, I have to say 'You said that you are hungry' to correctly report what you said. So, if 'is cool' functions like 'I', then if you say 'That movie is cool', I cannot correctly report what you said by saying 'You said that that movie is cool'. But I can. So, the second version of the subjectivist/relativist view is false.

Let me sum up what I have done in this post. I have introduced and argued against two versions of the subjectivist/relativist approach to ascriptions of coolness. I conclude that these versions fail. More tentatively, I conclude that no version of the subjectivist/relativist approach is correct. Given that this is so, what approach should we take to ascriptions of coolness? I think that the obvious alternative is an objectivist approach according to which there are objective facts of coolness that are not "subjective" or "relative to taste". On this view, whenever one person describes something using the words 'is cool' and another describes the same thing using the words 'is not cool', one and only one of them is right. The other is simply wrong.

You write like a girl!

Some folks who read this might be interesting in checking out the following website:

http://www.bookblog.net/gender/genie.php

If you input text and specify what sort of work the text is from (fiction, nonfiction, or blog entry), it will attempt to determine the gender of the author of the text. (It uses some algorithm based on works by authors with a known gender.)

Be warned, though, that it apparently has some strange results in some cases, as noted in the comments section of this blog post: http://tar.weatherson.org/2007/04/11/women-in-philosophy/#comments

Pro-Attitude Theology Redux

In my last post I introduced pro-attitude theology as an alternative to perfect being theology. As developed there, pro-attitude theology rests on the following claims:
(A) For every pro-attitude A, there is at least one property P such that something that has P deserves having someone bear A towards it.
(B) Every pro-attitude comes in degrees.
(C) For every pro-attitude A, there is a highest degree of A.
(D) For every pro-attitude A and every property P, if something that has P deserves having someone bear A towards it, then there is some degree of P such that something that has P to at that degree deserves having someone bear A towards it to the highest degree.

(A) and (B) are, I think, relatively uncontroversial. At the very least, they seem plausible. On the other hand, (C) and (D) seem less plausible. Perhaps some pro-attitudes are such that there is no highest degree of them. And perhaps there are properties such that something that has them deserves having someone bear some pro-attitude towards it but are also such that there is no degree of those properties such that something that has one of those properties to that degree deserves having someone bear the corresponding pro-attitude towards it to the highest degree.

Here I would like to suggest a way of modifying pro-attitude theology that holds onto (A)-(C) but does not suppose (D). According to this modification of pro-attitude theology, something is divine just in case for every pro-attitude A, that thing has some property P to some degree D such that something that has P to degree D deserves having someone bear A towards it to the highest degree. According to this modification of pro-attitude theology, then, a divine being is simply something that deserves having every pro-attitude borne to it to the highest degree.

The interesting thing about this modified sort of pro-attitude theology is that it allows for different "ways of being divine", as it were. What mean by this is that whereas the form of pro-attitude theology discussed in the previous post required that a divine being have every pro-attitude worthy property and that it have that property to whatever degree is necessary to make it deserve to have someone bear the corresponding pro-attitude towards it to the highest degree, the modified sort of pro-attitude theology I am currently discussing does not require that a divine being have every pro-attitude worthy property. Rather it simply requires that it have some of those properties to such a degree that it deserves having every pro-attitude borne towards it to the highest degree. What this means is that there might be two divine beings that have different pro-attitude worthy properties. All that is required, in the end, is that they deserve to have every pro-attitude borne towards them in the highest degree. And it may be in virtue of having different properties that they deserve this.

Perfect Being Theology and Pro-Attitude Theology

Western philosophical theology has been dominated by so-called "perfect being theology". According to many, perfect being theology traces back to St. Anselm of Canterbury and his conception of God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived". However, I do not wish to join the debate over the historical origins of perfect being theology here. Rather, I will present a (probably overly simplistic) version of perfect being theology to serve as a foil for what I will call "pro-attitude theology".

The central concept of perfect being theology is that of a great-making property, where a great-making property is a property such that all things being equal, something is greater if it has that property than if it lacks it. (Great-making properties can be thought of by analogy to intrinsically good-making properties. However, I do not give the details of the analogy here.) Give the concept of a great-making property, a proponent of perfect being theology then defines divinity as follows: Something is divine just in case it has every great-making property to the highest degree. (Notice that this is consistent with the claim that some great-making properties do not come in degrees. In those cases, a divine being must simply have those properties.) Finally, a perfect being theologian asserts the existence of a divine being: There is something that is divine.

Perfect being theologians are divided on the question of exactly what properties a being must have in order to be divine. They commonly think that the property of having power is a great-making property, so that all things being equal, something is greater if it has power than if it lacks power. So, they claim that one property a divine being must have is omnipotence, the property of having power to the highest degree. Similarly, it is thought that the properties of having knowledge and being morally good are great-making properties, so that in order to be divine a being must be omniscient (that is, it must have the property of being knowledgeable to the highest degree) and omnibenevolent (that is, it must have the property of being morally good to the highest degree). Other properties that perfect being theologians often claim a being must have to be divine include necessary existence and incorporeality.

Hopefully the basic idea behind perfect being theology is relatively clear at this point. I now want to introduce at this point a different approach to theology, which I call "pro-attitude theology". The central concept of pro-attitude theology is not that of a great-making property. Rather, it is that of a pro-attitude worthy property. Before explaining what a pro-attitude worthy property is, however, let me first explain what a pro-attitude is. It is clear that among the attitudes we can take towards something, some are positive in some sense (desiring, loving, admiring, being in awe of, and so forth) whereas others are negative (despising, hating, feeling disgust towards, and so forth). The pro-attitudes are all and only those attitudes that are positive in some sense.

Now the central concept of pro-attitude theology is that of a pro-attitude worthy property. A pro-attitude worthy property is a property such that there is some pro-attitude such that all things being equal, something is more deserving of having someone bear that pro-attitude towards it if it has that property than if it lacks that property. (One could think of pro-attitude worthy properties in terms of reasons; that is, having a pro-attitude worthy property is a reason to have a pro-attitude towards that thing.) Given the concept of a pro-attitude worthy property, a pro-attitude theologian can now offer a competing definition of divinity, as follows: Something is divine just in case it has every pro-attitude worthy property such a degree that it deserves having someone bear each pro-attitude towards it to the highest degree. In other words, according to pro-attitude theology, something is divine just in case it is deserving of having everyone bear each and every pro-attitude to it to the highest degree. (Note that it is clear that many pro-attitudes come in degrees. For instance, we can desire one thing more than another, admire one thing more than another, etc. One important assumption made by pro-attitude theology is that each and every pro-attitude is such that there is a highest degree to which it can be had towards something. Whether or not this is true will partially determine to what extent pro-attitude theology is a plausible alternative to perfect being theology.) And, of course, a pro-attitude theologian affirms the existence of a divine being: There is something that is divine.

We can now consider what properties something must have in order to be divine, given pro-attitude theology. First consider being powerful. Presumably, this is a pro-attitude worthy property; that is, there is some pro-attitude such that having the property of being powerful makes something more worthy of having someone bear that pro-attitude towards it if it powerful than if it isn't. However, to what degree must a divine being have the property of being powerful? Only to whatever degree is necessary to make it worthy of having someone bear that pro-attitude towards it to the highest degree. Perhaps this will require omnipotence, perhaps not. Similarly for omniscience and omnibenevolence.

Are there any properties that a divine being must have given pro-attitude theology that most perfect being theologians would deny it must have? It seems so. Consider the property of being large. This property seems to be a pro-attitude worthy property, since it seems that all things being equal, something is more worthy of being in awe of if it is large than if it is not. So, in order to be divine, something must have the property being large to whatever degree is necessary to be deserving of having something be in awe of it to the highest degree. These sorts of considerations, I think would lead the perfect being theologian at least towards thinking that a divine being must be omnipresent, if not towards thinking that pantheism is true.

Pro-attitude theology might also lead its proponents to endorse a version of the doctrine of the incarnation. After all, it seems that the property of being courageous in the face of danger is a pro-attitude worthy property. So, a divine being must have that property to whatever degree is required to be worthy of someone bearing the corresponding pro-attitude towards it to the highest degree. But to have that property something must actually face danger. So perhaps this suggests that a divine being would, on pro-attitude theology, temporarily renounce its power so that it could be in danger like a mere mortal.

Other properties that a divine being would likely be required to have to some degree or other on pro-attitude theology include being loving, being forgiving, being beautiful, being complex, and so forth.

I would now like to conclude my discussion by noting some points of intersection between this blog post and my last post. In the last post I argued that there are a wide range of questions with which the philosopher of religion should be concerned. To that list, I add two others:
Is there a divine being, in the perfect being theologian's sense?
Is there a divine being, in the pro-attitude theologian's sense?
Notice that the answers to these two questions might differ from one another and from the answers to the questions I mentioned in that other post.