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Tuesday, November 25, 2008

A Thanksgiving Day Prayer

Dear God (if a God there be),

Tomorrow many Americans, including me, will partake of an abundant Thanksgiving Day meal. Very likely many of them will be offering prayers of thanks to you. I, however, will not. Sorry.

It's not that I won't enjoy the meal and it's not that I'm unhappy with the circumstances in life that allow me the resources to partake in it. Quite the contrary.

Instead, it's the fact that I know that Thanksgiving is more than a day on which I receive unusually hearty portions. It is also a day like any other; it is a day on which 15,000 or more children starve to death.

Forgive me for thinking this, but this suggests to me that you're not quite the great guy many people think you are. Maybe you simply don't care about the death of these children, or maybe you're unable to prevent it, or maybe you simply didn't know about it until I told you. I'm not sure which.

What I am sure about is this. If the price of admission to a universe in which I have food in abundance on Thanksgiving Day is the death of starvation of 15,000 kids, I would gladly return the ticket.

And if that's rebellion, so be it. Amen.

Sunday, November 23, 2008

The Simple Argument from Evil

In my last post, I explained why the Fine-Tuning Argument (which I take to be the strongest argument in favor of Theism*) doesn't provide any good reason to think that Theism* is true. This is important because Theism* captures one of the most central beliefs of most Western theists: most Western theists think that there is one and only one omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent--namely, God.

In this post and in a forthcoming post I will explain why I think that there are good reasons to deny Theism*. I will focus on arguments from evil, the most common sort of argument against Theism*. In this post, I will present a simple argument from evil and explain why it is best to modify this argument. Then, in my post entitled "The Sophisticated Argument from Evil", I will formulate a more sophisticated argument from evil and explain why I think that it provides good reasons to think that Theism* is false.

Without further ado, the argument I will focus on in this post can be formulated as follows:

The Simple Argument from Evil
1. If there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen.
2. Bad things sometimes happen.
3. Therefore, there is nothing that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
4. If (3), then (T*) is false.
5. Therefore, (T*) is false.

Why think that the premises of this argument are true? Here are reasons to think that they are:

Explanation of the Simple Argument from Evil
Premise (1): Suppose that there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Call it 'Omni'. Then every bad thing must fall into one of the following four categories: (a) bad things that Omni prevents, (b) bad things that someone other than Omni prevents, (c) bad things that no one prevents but that nevertheless don't happen, or (d) bad things that no one prevents and that happen. Now clearly none of the bad things in category (c) happen. Furthermore, none of the bad things in categories (a) and (b) happen either, since every bad thing in these categories is prevented and if a bad thing is prevented, then it doesn't happen. Thus, if bad things sometimes happen, those bad things are in category (d). But there are no bad things in category (d). For if there were, then Omni would want them not to happen (since Omni is omnibenevolent and thus doesn't want any bad things to happen), Omni would know that they will happen unless Omni prevents them (since Omni, being omniscient, would know that no one other than Omni will prevent them and that they will happen unless someone prevents them), and Omni would have the ability to prevent them (since Omni is omnipotent). However, if Omni wants something not to happen, knows that it will happen unless Omni prevents it, and has the ability to prevent it, then Omni prevents it. It follows that there are no bad things in category (d), since if there were, Omni would prevent them and so they would be in category (a) rather than category (d). We showed before, however, that if bad things sometimes happen, those bad things are in category (d). But we have just shown that there are no bad things in category (d). We can conclude, then, that bad things never happen. Therefore, if there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen; that is, premise (1) is true.

Premise (2): Consider people being burned alive in houses set ablaze by lightning, children drowning in ponds, and fawns suffering painful deaths in forest fires. Worse, consider the Holocaust. These are all bad things that have happened. Therefore, bad things sometimes happen; that is, premise (2) is true.

Premise (3): Premise (3) is a subconclusion; if premises (1) and (2) are true, then premise (3) must also be true. So we needn't give any independent reasons to think that premise (3) is true; the reasons given to think that premises (1) and (2) are true are also reasons to think that premise (3) is true.

Premise (4): Suppose that (3) is true; that is, suppose that there is nothing that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Then there can't be one and only one omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent, since if there is nothing that has certain properties, then there isn't one and only one thing that has those properties and besides. Therefore, if (3), then (T*) is false; that is, premise (4) is true.

Having presented the Simple Argument from Evil and given reasons to think that its premises are true, I now turn to explaining why it is best to modify the argument. Before doing so, however, let me note that premises (2) and (4) seem beyond reproach. When explaining why it is best to modify the argument, then, I will focus on premise (1).

Premise (1) says, remember, that if there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen. I have given reasons to think that this premise is true above. However, some may have doubts about it. To see why these doubts might arise, pretend that there's someone, Alice, who is omnibenevolent; that is, pretend that no one could be better than Alice. But don't assume anything about Alice's abilities or about Alice's knowledge; in particular, don't assume that Alice is omnipotent or that Alice is omniscient.

Given that Alice is omnibenevolent, which bad things will Alice prevent? Well, clearly Alice won't prevent bad things that she doesn't have the ability to prevent. Nor will she prevent bad things that she knows won't happen whether or not she prevents them. What about bad things that she doesn't know will happen unless she prevents them? She might not prevent those either. Are there any other bad things she might not prevent? Yes. Perhaps there are bad things that she can't prevent without thereby ensuring that something as bad or worse will happen, in which case she might not prevent those things. Furthermore, perhaps there are bad things that she can't prevent without thereby ensuring that something as good as they are bad or better won't happen. And she might not prevent these either.

Suppose, however, that b is a bad thing meeting the following conditions: (i) b will happen unless Alice prevents b, (ii) Alice knows that b will happen unless Alice prevents b, (iii) Alice is able to prevent b, (iv) Alice is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as bad as or worse than b will happen, and (v) Alice is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as good as b is bad or better won't happen. Given that Alice is omnibenevolent, it seems as though Alice would prevent b in these circumstances.

These considerations suggest the following principle:

A Principle about Omnibenevolence (PO): If x is omnibenevolent and b is a bad thing that will happen unless x prevents b, then: if x knows that b will happen unless x prevents b, x is able to prevent b, x is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as bad as or worse than b will happen, and x is able to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as good as b is bad or better won't happen, then x prevents b.

Let's now apply (PO) to the case of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being. Since such a being is omniscient, the clause that reads "x knows that b will happen unless x prevents b" is redundant and thus may be removed. Furthermore, since such a being is omnipotent and thus has every ability that something could have, the other clauses can be modified. The resulting principle is:

A Principle about Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Omnibenevolence (POOO): If x is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent and b is a bad thing that will happen unless x prevents b, then: if there could be something with the ability to prevent b, there could be something with the ability to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as bad as or worse than b will happen, and there could be something with the ability to prevent b without thereby ensuring that something as good as b is bad or better won't happen, then x prevents b.

We can now see why it is best to modify the Simple Argument from Evil. Premise (2) of the Simple Argument from Evil claims that if there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then bad things never happen. The idea is that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being would have the power, knowledge, and desire necessary to ensure that no bad things ever happen. But consider (POOO). It does not ensure this. Perhaps some of the bad things that happen are bad things that nothing could have the ability to prevent, or that nothing could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equally bad or worse thing will happen, or that nothing could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equal or greater good won't happen. (POOO) does not ensure that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being would prevent such things.

Thus, in order to show that premise (2) of the Simple Argument from Evil is true, we would have to show that every bad thing that happens is one that something could have the ability to prevent, is one that something could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equally bad or worse thing will happen, and is one that something could have the ability to prevent without thereby ensuring that an equal or greater good won't happen. Perhaps this could be done. But notice that it would take a lot of work. Also notice this work is superfluous. If it can be shown that just some of the bad things that happen meet the conditions set out in the first sentence of this paragraph, it will have been shown that there is nothing that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Thus, the Simple Argument from Evil should be modified to focus on whether bad things that meet the conditions set out in the first sentence ever happen. Otherwise a lot of unnecessary work would be required.

Friday, November 21, 2008

Fine-Tuning

In my opinion, the strongest argument in favor of the existence of God is the fine-tuning argument. I also like certain versions of the cosmological argument, but I don't think that they're as strong as the fine-tuning argument. Traditional versions of the argument from design are, I think failures (although I can understand why they were formerly found plausible). And it seems to me that ontological arguments are as well; they don't provide any good reasons to think that their conclusion is true. Here, then, I present a version of the fine-tuning argument and explain why although I think it is somewhat strong, I also think that it doesn't provide any good reason to think that its conclusion is true.

Strictly speaking, the fine-tuning argument I will present isn't an argument for the conclusion that God exists. Instead, it is an argument for the conclusion that Theism* is true:

Theism* (T*): There is one and only one omnipotent (i.e., all-powerful), omniscient (i.e., all-knowing), omnibenevolent (i.e., all-good), creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent.

It will be helpful to define the terms that appear in this statement of (T*) (and offer some clarificatory remarks). I do so as follows:

x is omnipotent if and only if for all actions A, if there could be something with the ability to perform A, then x has the ability to perform A.


x is omniscient if and only if x knows every truth.

x is omnibenevolent if and only if no one could be better than x.
(We often rank people as better or worse than others. For instance, I am better than Hitler but I am worse than Ghandi. When we say that something is omnibenevolent, we're saying that no matter what, nothing can be better than it is.)

x is creative if and only if every contingent existent depends on x for its existence.
(x is a contingent existent if and only if x could have not existed. For instance, I am a contingent existent. I could have not existed. After all, if my parents hadn't engaged in certain activities, I would not have existed, and my parents could have not engaged in those activities.)

x is wholly immaterial if and only if (i) x is not a material object and (ii) none of x's parts are material objects.

x is a necessary existent if and only if x is not a contingent existent.
(Whereas I am a contingent existent, since I could have not existed, a necessary existent must have existed. If something is a necessary existent, it's simply impossible for it not to exist.)

With these preliminaries out of the way, I now turn to stating the fine-tuning argument:

The Fine-Tuning Argument
1. The fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe are within the very narrow range required for life to exist.
2. If (1), then something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe.
3. If something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe, then (T*) is true.
4. Therefore, (T*) is true

Why think that the premises of this argument are true? Here are reasons to think that each premise is true:

Explanation of the Fine-Tuning Argument
Premise (1): Recent work in physics has shown that this premise is true. For instance, it has shown that life couldn't exist if the strong nuclear force were stronger or weaker by 5%, or if gravity were just a little stronger or weaker, or if the electromagnetic force were slightly stronger or weaker. Furthermore, it has also shown that if there were slightly more matter at the beginning of the universe, the universe would have recollapsed very soon after the Big Bang and so life would not have existed, and that if there were slightly less matter at the beginning of the universe, the universe would have expanded too quickly for complex molecules to form and so life would not have existed. Thus, there is a very narrow range of the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe required for life to exist. But life does exist, so the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe is within that very narrow range. Therefore, premise (1) is true.

Premise (2): Suppose that (1) is true; that is, suppose that the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe are within the very narrow range required for life to exist. (From now on, I will abbreviate 'the fundamental laws and parameters of physics and the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe' as 'the fundamental physical parameters'.) Then either something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters or the fundamental physical parameters acquired their values by chance. There is no third alternative. However, it is much more likely that something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters than that they acquired their values by chance. After all, it is very unlikely that the fundamental physical parameters would be within the very narrow range required for life to exist if they acquired their values by chance. On the other hand, it is pretty likely that they would be in that range if something that wanted life to exist set them up. Therefore, if (1), then something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters; that is, premise (2) is true.

Premise (3): Suppose that something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters. Call that being "the setter-upper". We seem to be able to infer a lot about what features the setter-upper has from the fact that the setter-upper set up the fundamental physical parameters. For instance, the setter-upper is creative, since every contingent existent depends on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence and the fundamental physical parameters depend on the setter-upper. It follows that every contingent existent depends on the setter-upper for its existence, and thus the setter-upper is creative. Furthermore, since the setter-upper set up the fundamental physical parameters, it does not depend on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence. Thus, the setter-upper is a necessary existent (since every contingent existent depends on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence) and the setter-upper is wholly immaterial (since every material object depends on the fundamental physical parameters for its existence). The setter-upper, then, is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent. In addition, the setter-upper had the ability to set up the fundamental physical parameters and is thus omnipotent, the setter-upper knew how to set up the fundamental physical parameters and is thus omniscient, and the setter-upper wanted life to exist and is thus omnibenevolent. So, the setter-upper is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, creative, and wholly immaterial necessary existent. And the setter-upper is clearly the only thing with those properties. Therefore, if something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters, then (T*) is true; that is, premise (3) is true.

I have now stated the Fine-Tuning Argument and given reasons to think that each of its premises is true. Since the Fine-Tuning Argument is valid, if the reasons given to think that each of its premises are true are good reasons, then we have good reasons to think that its conclusion is true. The next question to consider, then, is whether the reasons given to think that the premises of the Fine-Tuning Argument are true are in fact good reasons. I will argue that they are not:

Objections to the Fine-Tuning Argument

Objection #1: There is no good reason to think that premise (2) is true. Throughout the Fine-Tuning Argument, it is assumed that there is only one universe. But there is no good reason to think that's true. Because of this, there is no good reason to think that the only alternatives are that something that wanted life to exist set up the fundamental physical parameters or that the fundamental physical parameters acquired their values by chance. Perhaps instead for any values the fundamental physical parameters might have, there is a universe in which they have those values. On this alternative, however, it is very likely that there is a universe in which the fundamental physical parameters are within the very narrow range required for life to exist.

Objection #2: There is no good reason to think that premise (2) is true. Here is another alternative on which it is pretty likely that the fundamental physical parameters would be in the very narrow range required for life to exist: Something obsessed with the values that the fundamental physical parameters in fact have set up the fundamental physical parameters. In fact, there are many motivations that something that set up the fundamental physical parameters might have that would make it pretty likely that they'd be in the very narrow range required for life to exist.

Objection #3: There is no good reason to think that premise (3) is true. Although there is good reason to think that if something set up the fundamental physical parameters, then it is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent, there is no good reason to think that it is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. For although it clearly had the ability to set up the fundamental physical parameters, perhaps it has no other abilities; although it knew how to set up the fundamental physical parameters, perhaps it has no other knowledge; and although it wants life to exist, perhaps it only wants life to exist because it likes it when things die painful deaths and knows this is impossible unless life exists (and thus it is not omnibenevolent).

These objections show that the Fine-Tuning Argument doesn't provide good reasons to think that (T*) is true. However, it does seem that it provides good reason to think that the following is true:

(FTC) Either (i) for any values the fundamental physical parameters might have, there is a universe in which they have those values, or (ii) there is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent that set up the fundamental physical parameters and that being has one of the motivations that make it pretty likely that the fundamental physical parameters would be in the very narrow range required for life to exist.

In fact, it seems to me that the Fine-Tuning Argument provides rather strong reasons to think that (FTC) is true.

A final question: Are there any reasons to think that clause (i) of (FTC) is true rather than clause (ii), or vice-versa? One reason to think that clause (i) is true rather than clause (ii) is that clause (ii) requires postulating a being of an unfamiliar sort; the beings with which we are familiar are not creative and wholly immaterial necessary existents that have set up the fundamental physical parameters. In contrast, clause (i) doesn't require us to postulate beings of an unfamiliar sort; it merely requires us to postulate universes, and we are all familiar with our universe. On the other hand, one reason to think that clause (ii) is true rather than clause (i) is that clause (i) requires us to postulate a universe for any values the fundamental physical parameters might have. So, since there are an infinite number of values that the fundamental physical parameters might have, it requires us to postulate an infinite number of universes. In contrast, clause (ii) requires us to postulate only one being.

Thus, there are reasons to prefer clause (i) to clause (ii) and there are reasons to prefer clause (ii) to clause (i). I am inclined to think that the reasons to prefer clause (ii) to clause (i) are somewhat stronger than the reasons to prefer clause (i) to clause (ii). Thus, I am inclined to think that in addition to providing rather strong reasons to think that (FTC) is true, the Fine-Tuning Argument also provides some (rather weak) reason to think that the following is true:

(FTC*): There is a creative and wholly immaterial necessary existent that set up the fundamental physical parameters and that has one of the motivations that make it pretty likely that the fundamental physical parameters would be in the very narrow range required for life to exist.